RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
LAW OF THE SEA -PROPOSED
ERAL RESOURCES ACT
I.

DEEP SEABED HARD MIN-

HistoricalBackground

Federal legislation to authorize United States mining companies
to proceed toward exploration and recovery of manganese nodules
from the deep seabed1 is almost certain to be enacted during the
96th Congress. This legislation seeks to promote the orderly
development of mineral resources from the deep seabed as an interim measure prior to the enactment of a superseding international treaty. During the 96th Congress, the House of Representatives' passage of the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act 2 was the
culmination of congressional efforts since 1971 to get a similar bill
passed. The Senate version of this bill was reported out of committee but did not reach the floor of the Senate for a vote before the
session ended.8
Congressional attention was first focused on the exploitation of
deep seabed mineral resources in 1967 in reaction to Malta's proposal in the United Nations that an international agency be
established to administer and control the development of these
resources, which were described as "the common heritage of
mankind."' Congress responded to this proposal by introducing
resolutions, the majority of which were opposed to giving immediate control over the ocean mineral resources to an international authority. Hearings in 1968, 1969 and 1970 by several congressional subcommittees examined various policy considerations
These manganese nodules are potato-shaped deposits found in extensive quantities on
the floor of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. They contain rich
deposits of the commercially important metals copper, nickel, manganese, and cobalt. The
United States imports these metals in the following percentages: cobalt and manganese100%; nickel-71%; copper-15%. At present there are five multinational seabed mining
consortia, each with major U.S. industry participation, which are in a position to accelerate
their commercial development programs and begin a full-scale commercial recovery around
1985. H.R. REP. No. 558, Part 1. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-1125, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess 35 (1978).
H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H. 7341 (daily ed. July 26, 1978), passed
as amended by House, 124 CONG REc. H. 7382-83 (daily ed. July 26, 1978).

S.2053, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), S.REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
U.N. DOC. A/6695 (1967).
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on the subject. The most active of these subcommittees, the
Senate Interior Committee's Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf chaired by Lee Metcalf, investigated in particular
the President's 1970 ocean policy statement calling for a seabed
treaty and an international authority, as well as the possibility of
an interim policy to insure continued development related to
mineral recovery by U.S. nationals.' The testimony of representatives of the American Mining Congress at these hearings
prompted Senator Metcalf to introduce the first deep seabed hard
minerals bill on November 2, 1971.6 An identical bill was intro7
duced in the House in early 1972 by Representative Downing.
This first bill and subsequent versions in 1973, 1974, and 19758
generated considerable discussion from different interests on the
subject of ocean mining. None of these bills was ever reported out
of committee in the House or Senate, and often the bills never advanced beyond the subcommittee level. This lack of progress can
be attributed in large part to the Administration's opposition to
any legislation on mining the seabed. Action by the committees
was continuously postponed in response to the Administration's
argument that enactment of legislation so unilateral in nature
would upset or even destroy the ongoing negotiations at the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).9
The U.S. has participated in UNCLOS since 1958. According to
a congressional advisor to the U.S. delegation, agreement has
been reached in principle regarding the issues of offshore oil and
gas rights, fishery management, navigation through straits,
marine pollution, limits on territorial seas, and economic zones. 10
These areas of agreement are not insulated from the quandary
that has developed over seabed mining, however.
The political and legal status of the seabed is uncertain,
primarily because there is no definitive international law governing the issue. The developed and the developing nations assert
Cong. Res. Service, Ocean Manganese Nodules 61-66 (Feb. 1976).
S. 2801, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Metcalf, Foreward, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 425
(1973).
H.R. 13904, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
H.R. 9, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 1134, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 12233, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 11879, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1270, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975); H.R. 6017, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 713, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
' Cong. Res. Service, Ocean Manganese Nodules 66-84 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 88, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1977); S. REP. No. 754, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1976).
1*124 CONG. REC. 114, H.7372-3 (daily ed., July 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Bedell).

1979]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

conflicting views on the exploitability of seabed resources." These
views are derived from their contrary interpretations of two
United Nations Resolutions relating to the seabed. The Moratorium Declaration, a 1969 Resolution, declared that all nations
should refrain from initiating any seabed mining operations
beyond their territorial limits before an UNCLOS treaty was
signed. This measure was sponsored and supported by developing
nations 2 and, while staunchly opposed by industrialized nations,
was passed in the General Assembly." The U.S. strongly protested passage of this Resolution, claiming that it would lead
coastal states desiring to circumvent the Resolution to expand
their seabed jurisdictions to include deep seabed mine sites." The
U.S. delegation announced that it would not be legally bound by
the Moratorium Declaration since it was not international law, but
carried only a recommendary effect. 15
The U.S. supported General Assembly Resolution 2749 in 1970"',
which declared the seabed and its resources to be the "common
heritage of mankind" and not subject to appropriation or claim or
exercise of sovereignity
The Resolution did not specifically
define "common heritage," which undoubtedly contributed to its
unopposed passage. 8 The developing nations interpreted this
declaration to establish the seabed resources as the common property of all mankind, thus making exploitation of these resources
outside the context of an international agreement a violation of international law. The U.S. and other industrialized countries maintained to the contrary that seabed mining was a protected right
" The developed nations with the technology to mine the seabed want political control of
the International Seabed Authority to be determined partly by the capital contributions of
the nations and not solely on a one nation-one vote basis, with assurances of a parallel
system of exploitation so that state and private companies can mine the seabed along with
the Enterprise, the internationally-operated mining concern which would be established by
the International Seabed Authority. The developing nations Group of 77, now numbering
119 states, is diametrically opposed to the developed nations' on the central issues of
political control and the system of exploitation. They want control of the authority to be
based on a one nation-one vote system, and they want the Enterprise to have the exclusive
authority to exploit the resources.
The 'Group of 77'-originally, 77 developing countries.
" Resolution 2574 passed 62-28-28.
24 U.N. GAOR (1833d plen. Mtg.) 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1833 (1969).
15 Id.
" G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2749 (1970).
"

Id. at 22.
Resolution 2749 passed 108-0-14.
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under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, 9 and that the Declaration of Principles was intended simply as a call for an international convention to give content to the common heritage
concept.' However, the U.S. delegation to the U.N. has subsequently indicated that the particulars of the UNCLOS pact would
be more important than the "common heritage" concept itself.
Three negotiating texts have been introduced during the course
of UNCLOS negotiations.2" However, at the close of the most recent sessions', UNCLOS members hardly seemed on the verge of
a settlement of the seabed mining issue. The majority of the participants did not share the United States' sense of urgency for a
rapid conclusion of a treaty. The sixth and seventh sessions were
largely devoid of agreement on new, substantive seabed issues,
but instead focused largely on procedural questions.
This lack of progress has led to charges that the Conference is
being deliberately stalled by certain UNCLOS members."3 An
early conclusion of a treaty may be seen by the land-based mineral
exporting states as contrary to their interests since the treaty
may include neither provisions for compensation to them for lost
mineral sales revenues nor limits on seabed mineral extraction. In
addition, delay might give the developing countries leverage to
negotiate for advantageous revenue and technology sharing concessions from the developed countries.
After the sixth session of UNCLOS ended in July of 1977 with
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, which U.S. Ambassador Elliot Richardson termed "fundamentally unacceptable"
to the United States,"' the Carter administration endorsed the
passage of domestic legislation. Richardson stated in testimony
before two Senate Committees on October 4, 1977 that the Ad" See Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. Hearings and Markup on H.R. 3350
before the House Comm. on International Relations and its Subcommittees on International Organizationsand on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
85 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Deep Seabed Hearings and Markup] (statement of Northcutt
Ely).
"' Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the Sea The Casefor
Continued Efforts, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39, 54-56 (1978).
21 Included are the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) 4 Third
U.N. CONF (Third
Session, Geneva, 1975) U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8., Revised Single Negotiating Text
(RSNT) 5 Third U.N. CONF (Fourth Session, New York, 1976) U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.
10.
" The Seventh Session of the Third Conference in New York, Sept. 15, 1978.
21 Professor Knight is utterly convinced that this is the case in A Reply
to Deep Sea
Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9 INT'L LAWYER 751 (1975).
24 H.R. REP. No. 588, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29 (1977).
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ministration would support legislation authorizing U.S. mining of
the seabed whether or note there were an international treaty.'
Another major factor spurring Congress toward enactment of
legislation was the urgency expressed by the mining consortia for
legislative authorization of mining the seabed to justify the capital
outlays necessary for continued research and development.
Throughout 1978 different versions of the bills progressed
through their respective committees in the House and Senate.2"
Provisions H.R. 3350 and S. 2053 are substantially the same bill
in both content and structure, each consisting of a preamble of
several sections and four Titles. The preamble first presents findings establishing the need for a domestic interim program to encourage commercial recovery and processing of seabed manganese nodulesY The findings and purposes of this legislation also
stress: (1) the interim nature of the program and its intended
supercession by an international agreement; (2) the necessity of
developing the seabed in a manner which protects the environment and promotes the safety of life and property at sea; (3) the
encouragement of successful negotiation of a comprehensive international treaty which will define the principle that the mineral
resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind;' (4) the establishment in the meantime of a special fund
,1 H.R. REP. No. 588, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 30-37 (1977). Joint Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources of the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportationon S.
2053. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (1977) (statement of Hon. Elliot Richardson).
" H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) was introduced on February 9, 1977 by
Representatives Murphy and Breux. It was referred jointly to the Committees on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries and on Interior and Insular Affairs. After being reported favorably
with amendments by both committees, it was referred to the Committee on International
Relations. The Subcommittees on International Organizations and on International
Economic Policy and Trade held joint hearings and ordered H.R. 3350 favorably reported to
the full committee, which reported it with amendments on February 8, 1978. The Ways and
Means Committee next considered the bill and reported it with amendments on June 5,
1978. The bill reached the floor of the House for a vote on July 26, 1978, at which time it
passed with amendments by a vote of 312 to 80.
S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) was introduced by Senator Metcalf on August 5,
1977. It was referred jointly to the Committees on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
and Energy and Natural Resources and reported with amendments by these committees on
August 18, 1978. It was then referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and reported
by this committee with amendments on September 11, 1978. Two Senators refused to consent to the time limitation rule for this bill and prevented its reaching the Senate floor for a
vote before the session ended on October 15, 1978.
H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1970); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1977).
28 Here, as in the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749, no legal definition is given to
the "common heritage of mankind", noting, as the Resolution did, that this phrase would be
defined in a future comprehensive international Law of the Sea treaty.
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whose proceeds will be shared with the international community;
and (5) the encouragement of the continued development of necessary technology." The Senate bill also includes an additional section establishing international objectives.'
Title I establishes a comprehensive regulatory system which requires any U.S. citizen engaging in the development of these
resources to obtain a license for the exploratory phase and a permit for the commercial recovery phase. The House bill provides
for administration by the Secretary of Commerce, while the
Senate bill gives these duties to the Secretary of the Interior. 81 Title I also includes a disclaimer of any intention to exercise
sovereignty or exclusive rights over any area of the seabed. 2
Beyond certain guidelines and restrictions which he must
follow, the Secretary has considerable discretion in the granting
of licenses and permits and in setting the terms and conditions
under which they are held. He cannot, however, issue a license or
permit inconsistent with an international agreement or issue a
permit for a specific area to anyone but the licensee for that area.,
The House bill allows no recovery before January 1, 1980, but the
Senate bill extends this restriction to January 1, 1981." Permittees must comply with restrictions requiring mining, processing,
and at least one transportation vessel to be documented under the
laws of the United States.' In addition, the Senate bill requires
that mining and processing vessels be constructed in the United
" H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a)(b) (1970); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) and
(b) (1977).
SS. 2053 § 3.
" H.R. 3350 § 3(13); S. 2053 § 4(13). This division over the administrative agency has been
a constant battle from the earliest versions of the bill to present. The proponents of the Interior Department claim that its past responsibility for all federal involvement in mineral
development, its administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act and its Ocean
Mining Administration Office make it the better administrative agency. Commerce's supporters, on the other hand, assert that it should have the responsibility for ocean mineral
resource development because of its proven expertise through its National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration which has established the Office of Marine Minerals to coordinate programs on the subject and has conducted the DOMES tests since 1975. 124 CONG.
REC. H7348 (daily ed. July 26, 1978).
32H.R. 3350, § 101. S. 2053, § 3(a). This disclaimer is found in S. 2053 under "International
Objectives." The site-specific provisions of prior legislation, such as mapped-out mine sites,
were eliminated as inflammatory, suggesting an assertion by the U.S. of a right to exclude
all others from the designated mine sites. See Deep Seabed Hearings and Markup, supra
note 19, at 119 (statement of Rep. Bedell).
" H.R. 3350 § 103(c)(1)(A) & (B); S. 2053 § 102(c)(1XA) & (C).
" H.R. 3350 § 103(c)(1)(C); S. 2053 § 102(c)(1)(D).
" H.R. 3350 § 103(c)(2) & (3); S. 2053 § 102(c)(2).
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States.' In issuing regulations on the location of processing
plants, the Secretary is to take various factors into account, including the foreign policy interests of the United States and the
need to maximize employment opportunities in the U.S. 7 Several
factors are also specified for the Secretary's determination of the
applicants' priority of rights for receiving licenses.' To grant a
license or permit, the Secretary must determine that the applicant is financially responsible and possesses the necessary technological capability, and that his activities will not unreasonably
interfere with the interests of other states in their exercise of the
freedoms of the high seas, conflict with any international obligation of the United States, or pose an unreasonable threat to the
quality of the environment. 9 The Senate version also stipulates
that no situations be created that could lead to a breach of international peace and security involving armed conflict or pose an
inordinate threat to the safety of life and property at sea."0 In addition, the application must be screened for possible antitrust
violations before its approval."
There is great flexibility in the regulatory mechanism provided
for seabed mining. The Secretary may modify the license or permit
to conform with the above criteria, or he may amend the regulations
themselves."2 The Secretary's authority also extends to denying
the approval of applications, revoking or suspending licenses and
permits, and monitoring the licensee's or permittee's operations.'3
The House and Senate bills differ on the method of selection for
the location and size of the area in which a particular applicant
may undertake exploration and recovery. The House bill provides
for the Secretary to make these determinations and specifications
S. 2053 § 102(c)(2).
H.R. 3350 § 103(c)(5); S. 2053 § 102(c)(3).
" H.R. 3350 § 103(e); S. 2053 § 103(b).
H.R. 3350 § 103(f)(A)-(C); S.2053 § 103(e) & § 105(a). The Senate version provides for certification of every application based on public comments and consultation with other relevant agency heads and the applicant's compliance with the requirements of sections 101
through 103. S. 2053 § 103(h).
S5. 2053 § 105(a)(3) & (5).
H.R. 3350 § 103(j); S.2053 § 103(d). The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission are charged with the responsibility of antitrust review, although neither can veto
an application for possible antitrust violation. H. R. 3350 § 103(j)(5).
' H.R. 3350 § 103(i), § 106(c); S. 2053 § 104(c), § 401(c). Amendments in both are limited to
providing for conservation of natural resources and protecting the environment and the
safety of life and property at sea.
- H.R. 3350 § 104, § 106(b)(10); S. 2053 § 106, § 114.
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in each license or permit he issues." On the other hand, the Senate
bill calls for a work plan to be submitted by each applicant which
describes the area to be explored and includes a detailed explanation of the schedule and methods of exploration, anticipated expenditures, and measures to protect the environment. The Secretary approves the size and location of the work plan area selected
by the applicant so long as the size is a "logical mining unit" and
no adverse effects to the quality of the environment would be
created by recovery in this area. 5 Whereas the House bill uses
the general language "sufficient duration" as the term for a
license or permit," the Senate version provides for specific terms
of duration. 7
Protection of the quality of the environment during ocean mining activities is discussed in numerous provisions of both bills.
The Senate bill, however, provides for more extensive environmental regulation. Its principal section on the environment
orders the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to
expand and accelerate programs assessing the effects on the environment from development of deep sea mineral resources to aid
the Secretary's regulatory function. 8 Programmatic environmental impact statements are to be prepared and published by the
Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce in consultation with the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and other
appropriate federal agencies. These impact statements are required for issuance of every license and permit and are also
prepared, if the Secretaries find it necessary, for general areas in
which U.S. citizens will undertake exploration and commercial
recovery. 9 These environmental impact statements are considered by the Secretaries along with the advice of other relevant
agency heads in establishing the environmental regulations imposed on individual licensees and permittees. 0 Under the Senate
bill, licenses and permits must also contain regulations for the
prevention of waste and the later opportunity to secure the
H.R. 3350 § 106(b)(1).
S. 2053 § 103(a)(2)(B) & (C). The House narrowly defeated an amendment on the floor to
provide for a similar work plan. 124 CONG. REC. H7354 (daily ed., July 26, 1978).
" H.R. 3350 § 106(b)(2).
S 2053 § 107.
5.
S. 2053 § 108(h).
, S. 2053 § 108(c)(1) & (2), (d). H.R. 3350 § 105(a) & (b) does not provide for the Secretary
of Interior's participation.
S. 2053 § 108(b); H.R. 3350 § 106(a).
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unrecovered balance of nodules. 51 Moreover, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination provisions of the Clean Water Act"
are applicable to discharges from deep seabed mining vessels. 53 In
making modifications applicable to the original licenses or permits, both bills allow a balancing test to determine whether the
national need for hard mineral resources outweighs potential in54

jury to the quality of the environment.

Foreign nations passing similar mining legislation may be
designated "reciprocating states" by the President. 5 By entering
into bilateral or multilateral treaties with the U.S. and pledging
mutual recognition of licensing, other nations may join the U.S. in
this interim regime. To attain reciprocating state status, nations
must recognize the freedom of the high seas doctrine, prohibit
their citizens from engaging in activities conflicting with those of
U.S. licensees, and employ adequate enforcement safeguards to
that end. Additionally, reciprocating states must establish a
56
revenue sharing fund.

Title II addresses the effect on the bill of an international agreement. Although the bill is termed "transitional" pending the
entering of an international Law of the Sea treaty or other
multilateral or treaty agreement to which the United States is a
party, any provisions in this bill which are not inconsistent with
the international agreement shall continue to apply to U.S.
5

citizens.

1

The non-impairment provision has been perhaps the most hotly
contested area in the seabed mining legislation's history. Because
of strong opposition to any sort of government financial guarantees to the mining interests, such provisions have been dropped
by the House and Senate Committees. However, to give some
assurance to mining companies without guaranteeing indemnification, the House approved a grandfather clause which makes it
clear that an international agreement should include provisions
for nondiscriminatory assured access to the seabeds for American
citizens while not impairing the value of their investments.' FearS. 2053 § 110.
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
S. 2053 § 116(d); S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
H.R. 3350 § 104(c)(2); S. 2053 § 105(a)(4).
H.R. 3350 & 107(c); S. 2053 § 117. S. 2053 gives this designation power to the Secretary
of the Interior.
H.R. 3350 § 107(a); S. 2053 § 117(a).
H.R. 3350 § 202; S. 2053 § 202.
N H.R. 3350 § 202(1)(A) & (B).
"
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ful of creating an impression that the government has a legal and
moral duty to compensate firms for investment losses, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee modified the House's language of
the grandfather clause. 9 Moreover, while the House version requires the Secretary to take all measures to insure that the integrity of investments previously made by U.S. citizens is protected
in the implementation of an international agreement," the Senate
version merely suggests that the Secretary secure the continued
operation of mineral recovery during the time prior to the agreement's entry into force. 1
Title III establishes the right of the Secretary to impose
penalties for violation of any provision of the Bill or of any term,
condition, or restriction of the license or permit.2 A criminal fine
may be imposed if a violation is committed willfully and knowingly;" otherwise violations carry a civil penalty."
Title IV of the House Bill, added by the House Ways and Means
Committee, establishes a tax on mineral resources removed from
the seabed and a revenue-sharing trust fund to receive the value
of this tax.6 5 A similar title was reported as a recommendation
from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for addition as an
amendment on the Senate floor." The sole difference between the
Senate and House versions is in the amount of the tax, the Senate
rate being 100/o of the "imputed value" of the mineral resources
recovered, while the House set a much lower rate of 3.75/o of imputed value.67 The imputed value is defined as 200/0 of the fair
market value of commercially recoverable minerals, yielding an effective rate of 20/0 under the Senate version and .75/o under the
House rate. The trust fund, under the management of the
Secretary of the Treasury, is to be applied to the anticipated requirement of any international deep seabed treaty that resources
from deep seabed mining be shared among nations. This treaty,
however, must enter into effect for the United States on or before
S. 2053 § 201(1)(A) & (B); S. REP. No. 95-1180, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1978).
H.R. 3350 § 202.
S. 2053 § 202.
H.R. 3350 § 301; S. 2053 § 301(1).
H.R. 3350 § 303; S. 2053 § 303.
H.R. 33-D § 302; S. 2053 § 302.
65 H.R. 3350, Title IV.
S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-11 (1978).
67 S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978); H.R. 3350 § 402; An. to 36 I.R.C. (1954),
Subch. F. § 449.5(b).
"
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ten years after the bill is enacted into law, or the trust fund may
be disposed of for other purposes.68
While the essence of H.R. 3350-and to an even greater degree
S. 2053-is the harmonious integration of U.S. legislation with an
anticipated treaty, several problems arising from the two bills
may undercut this policy. While both bills call for establishment of
a revenue sharing fund, the House version's effective rate of .75%
is likely to be a great deal lower than that eventually called for in
a Law of the Sea treaty. The Senate version's rate is more consistent with the 10% rate U.S. negotiators have already proposed at
the UNCLOS negotiations. 9
Another problem area may be the provision for awarding
reciprocating state status to those states establishing an interim
policy and practice compatible with that of the U.S. If an international treaty is not completed within the next few years, the
reciprocating state system may essentially create mini-treaties between the United States and other industrialized nations. 0 The
Senate version even cites such de facto bilateral treaties in its
opening section on "International Objectives" as a desirable alternative to a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty.7 Although such
treaties are a practical alternative for the United States if a
UNCLOS treaty fails, they would contradict the avowed U.S. position favoring international regulation only by a comprehensive
treaty.
A pro-industry provision for companies to designate specific
mine sites has been modified by the Senate concept of the work
plan. The Administration and many internationalists were opposed to specific mine sites because they might imply that the
U.S. government, through these companies, was claiming jurisdiction over the seabed." The work plan alternative is supposed to
remove any such claim of right. The effectiveness of the work plan
in achieving this result has been questioned,73 however, and
Richardson admitted in testimony before the House Committee on
- H.R. 3350 § 403(d) & (e); S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978).
61 124 CONG. REC. H7371-7373 (daily ed. July 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Bedell and Rep.
Stark).
70 McLean, UnilateralMining Bills Provoke Sharp Response, Neptune, Sept. 1978, at 7.
S. 2053 § 3(b)(1).
7' Hearings on H.R. 3350 before the House Committee on InternationalRelations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1978) (testimony of Hon. Elliot Richardson); 124 CONG. REc. H7354 (daily
ed. July 26, 1978) (remarks of Rep. McClosky).
"' Hearings on H.R. 3350 before the House Committee on InternationalRelations, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1978) (testimony of Samuel Levering).
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International Relations that the change from specific mine site to
work plan was largely cosmetic."
Despite the conscious efforts of Congress to enact legislation
compatible with an anticipated Law of the Sea treaty, the developing nations Group of 77 views any such legislation as having "no
validity in international law," so that "activities conducted
thereunder cannot be purported to acquire any legal status."7 5 The
deep seabed is one of the remaining unresolved issues delaying
the conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty. Opponents of the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act fear
that the Act, by unilaterally imposing a U.S.-initiated interim
regime, may generate a severe reaction at UNCLOS and destroy
the progress already made.7" In addition, the legislation might
eliminate most of the incentive for the U.S. to conclude an
UNCLOS pact, which would probably include much less favorable
terms.7 The Act's supporters claim, on the other hand, that it will
serve to express U.S. displeasure over UNCLOS stagnation and
break the deadlock on seabed rights."
There are several possible avenues that hostile reaction by such
factions as the Group of 77 could take. There could be protests in
an international forum, the passage of United Nations resolutions,
a request for an International Court of Justice advisory opinion,
suits in United States and foreign courts against the mining companies, and economic or political retaliation against the countries
and companies connected with the mining. Another tactical option
is to link deep seabed mining to such other international issues as
OPEC's oil policies, or to Law of the Sea issues such as the navigation rights for which the United States has been bargaining. 9
Finally, the developing nations might decide to set aside the
gentleman's agreement among UNCLOS participants requiring a
consensus, and adopt by a two-thirds vote a treaty unacceptable
to the industrialized nations. These industrialized nations would
then be likely to regulate mining among themselves through minitreaties, creating great confusion in the international law of seabed mining.
Id at 35 (testimony of Hon. Elliot Richardson).
7 United Nations Press Release, SEA/327, August 28, 1978 at 3.
76 Deep Seabed Hearings and Markup, supra note 32, at 346 (statement by Barbara
Weaver).
17 Id
at 344 (statement by Rep. Gerry Studds).
71 Id at 94 (statement by. Rep. John Murphy).
"' Charney, United States Interests in a Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Case for

Continued Efforts, 11

VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Whatever the effect, the overwhelming sentiment in the United
States opposes further delay in authorizing mining of the seabed.
If the seabed is to be mined in the near future, there are several
strong arguments for legislation to regulate this mining. First,
bankers providing the huge capital outlays for mining consortia's
research and development of the necessary technology are demanding assurances of security for the ocean mining before they will
grant additional loans. The mining consortia themselves are hesitant to continue their plans and investments at the pace that their
current research and development programs require in the
absence of a legal framework providing for licenses and permits °
In addition, the Administration maintains the domestic legislation
is necessary even after an international treaty is ratified to
regulate U.S. mining during the transition period before the treaty enters into force, and thereafter to assure compliance with it.8"
Betsy Cox
Frank Brogan
ADDENDUM
Near the close of the first session of the96th Congress, the Senate
passed the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. 2 The House bill,83
however, is still pending before two subcommittees of the Foreign
Affairs Committee which are waiting for the results of the 9th Session of the Third UNCLOS.84 If the House bill comes up for a floor
vote in the near future, the Deep Seabed Act could well become law
by the end of the 96th Congress.
'o
81

S. REP. No. 1180, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6 (1978).
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control Oceans and InternationalEn-

vironment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(testimony of Hon. Elliot Richardson).
" S. 493, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., passed as amended by Senate, 125 CONG. REc. S. 8554 (daily
ed. December 14, 1979).
H.R. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
After the first part of UNCLOS ends on April 4, 1980, Ambassador Richardson will
testify before the Foreign Affairs Committee with his prognosis and possible recommendations on the legislation. The subcommittees are then expected to mark up the bill and report it.

